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Cert to Cal. S. Ct. 
(Broussard, Bird, 
Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso; 
Grodin [cone]; Lucas 
[cone & d iss] ) 
*' SUPERIOR COURT~ State/Civil Timely 
c~~;-~~~ 
~~~- j 
1. SUMMARY: Petr cont ends that the California Supreme ~ 
Court erred in holding that there is no First Amendment right of ~ 
access to a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. t?z--v .;._ 
/6'f.~ 2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: One Robert Diaz was charged l...,... 
by California authorities with multiple murders. A preliminary~
hearing to determine whether the charges were supported by 
motion under California Penal Code §868, the municipal court 
closed the preliminary hearing to the publi6 and the press. 
Following the hearing, which lasted 41 days, the court determined 
-------~-~-~ 
that there was probable cause, and petr was held to answer in the 
Superior Court for Riverside County on 12 counts of murder. Petr 
then moved in the Superior Court for access to the transcript of 
-----------------·-----------the preliminary hearing. The court denied the motion, holding ---'-that there was a "reasonable likelihood that making all or any 
part of the transcript public might prejudice the defendant's 
right to a fair and impartial trial." 
Petr appealed ~ornia Court of Appeal. The court 
rejected petr's argument that the federal and state constitutions 
established a right of access to preliminary hearings. Although 
acknowledging that this Court had recognized a First Amendment 
v----
right of access to criminal trials, see Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 u.s. 596 (1982), and that some courts had 
extended this right to certain pretrial proceedings, the court 
-followed an earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, San 
Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), in 
holding that a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is 
probable cause to proceed against a defendant is different enough 
from a trial to make the right of access inapplicable. Turning 
to California Penal Code §868, which provides that "upon the -request of the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that 
--exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the 
shall exclude from the 
- " . 
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motion under California Penal Code §868, the municipal court 
closed the preliminary hearing to the public and the press. 
Following the hearing, which lasted 41 days, the court determined 
------~- ~
that there was probable cause, and petr was held to answer in the 
Superior Court for Riverside County on 12 counts of murder. Petr 
then moved in the Superior Court for access to the transcript of 
~---------------------------------------------------the preliminary hearing. ~he court denied the motion, holding 
~
that there was a "reasonable likelihood that making all or any 
part of the transcript public might prejudice the defendant's 
- - -- -
right to a fair and impartial trial." 
Petr appealed to th~ ~{i ;ornia Court of Appeal. The court 
rejected petr's argument that the federal and state constitutions 
established a right of access to preliminary hearings. Although 
acknowledging that this Court had recognized a First Amendment 
v--
right of access to criminal trials, see Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 u.s. 596 (1982), and that some courts had 
extended this right to certain pretrial proceedings, the court 
~ 
followed an earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, San 
Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), in 
holding that a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is 
probable cause to proceed against a defendant is different enough 
from a trial to make the right of access inapplicable. Turning 
to California Penal Code §868, which provides that "upon the --request of the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that 
--exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the 
fair an impart1al trial, the magistrate 
___:;> 
shall exclude from the examination every person except [the 
I 
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defendant, the attorneys, and court personnel]," the court held ~ 
that an order excluding the public and the press requi~d a (~ 
showing that there was a "reasonable likelihood of substantial ~ --
prej dice" to the defendant if the proceedings were not closed.  
Under the circumstances of this case, the standard was satisfied: 
the case had received extensive press coverage, the evidence - -- -----:;:; 
presented at the preliminary hearing was exclusively inculpatory, 
-·-~ 
and the hearing involved the presentation of inadmissible \ 
evidence and prejudicial remarks. Press access to the 
-------------------------
preliminary hearing would create the risk that Diaz would be 
deprived of his right to an impartial jury, and alternatives to 
closure were inadequate, as the only viable alternative to 
closure was a change of venue that would deny Diaz his right to 
be ~d in Riverside County and his right to a speedy trial. 
The Court of Appeal therefore affirmed the closure order. 
Petr successfully soug~cretionary review in the 
~lifornia Supreme Court~Noting that the c~was technically 
moot because (1) the transcript of the hearing had been made 
~ II 
available when Diaz waived his right to a jury trial and (2) the 
trial was over, the court nonetheless addressed the merits on the 
~
ground that "the case presents an important question affecting 
the public interest." Petn App A-2, n. 2. The court affirmed 
the Court of Appeal's determination that there is no First 
Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings in criminal 
cases. Like the lower court, the California Supreme Court 
recognized that this Court has held that there is such a right 
access to trials, see Globe Newspaper Co., supra, and to some 
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.( pretrial proceedings, see Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 
104 s.ct. 819 (1984) (voir dire). The court, however, stuck to 
the reasoning of its earlier decision in San Jose Mercury, supra: 
a preliminary hearing, in which often only the prosecution's 
evidence is presented and from which the public has historically 
been excluded, is materially different from a trial, and the 
First Amendment right of access is therefore inapplicable. 
The court, however, held that California Penal Code §868 
'--·--... - --· -·-- -·- --------
preserve the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. To give content to the 
---~
s t"atu fe'S-· requirement of "necessity," the court weighed the 
values served by openness against the potential dangers of open 
proceedings. The court noted that access to judicial proceedings 
helped educate the public about the workings of the system, 
inspired public confidence in the system, tended to minimize the 
possibility of persecution, favoritism and other forms of abuse, 
and served a cathartic function for the community as a whole. 
Moreover, the preliminary hearing was often the sole adversarial 
proceeding in a criminal case, and sometimes involved the 
resolution of important questions regarding admissibility of 
evidence and police misconduct. On the other hand, the court 
~~ observed that the presentation of evidence at a preliminary 
~ hearing was often~isleading a~one-sided, as the hearing's 
primary function was to determine whether the prosecution's case 
justified a trial. Moreover, the magistrates conducting such 
....,.· 
hearings were more likely than trial judges to err in rulings on 
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evidence, with the result that prejudicial and inadmissible 
information might be disclosed at the hearing. Thus, public 
access to preliminary hearings might distort the public's 
perception of the defendant's guilt or innocence and thereby 
infringe on his right to an impartial jury selected from his own 
community. 
The court concluded that these concerns were properly 
balanced--and the statutory requirement of "necessity" satisfied-
-by a standard under which preliminary hearings could be closed 
on the basis of "a substantial showing of potential prejudice" to 
the defendant. The court noted that petr urged that the proper 
test was whether there was a "substantial probability of 
irreparable damage" whereas Diaz asserted that only "a reasonable 
likelihood of substantial prejudice" need be shown. Although 
questioning the significance of the difference between the two 
standards, the court accepted Diaz's formulation, holding that 
the statutory standard for closure was satisfied when the 
defendant established "a reasonable likelihood of substantial 
prejudice." That standard having been satisfied in this case, 
the court affirmed. 
Justice Grodin concurred in the court's treatment of the 
statutory issue, but rejected the court's analysis of the 
constitutional issue as unnecessary to the result. He would not 
have reached the question whether a First Amendment right of 
access existed, for he was satisfied that if such a right 
existed, it did not require an open hearing when the defendant 
-6-
~ established that public access would result in a reasonable 
likelihood of substantial prejudice. 
Justice Lucas dissented from the majority's statutory 
analysis. Section 868, he argued, required that preliminary 
hearings be open unless closure was "necessary" to protect the 
defendant's rights. In his view, the statute meant what it said: 
the defendant had to establish not just that prejudice was 
reasonably likely unless the hearing were closed, but that 
closure was absolutely necessary to prevent injustice. Despite 
his disagreement with the majority, however, Justice Lucas 
concurred in the judgment. In his view, the case was moot. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the courts are divided 
over whether there is a First Amendment right of access to 
preliminary hearings in criminal cases. Four federal courts of 
appeals, petr contends, have held that the right of access 
extends to pretrial criminal proceedings. Application of the 
Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (CA2 1984); United States v. Chagra, 701 
F.2d 354 (CAS 1983); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 
(CA9 1982); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (CA3 1982). In 
addition, many state courts have held that the right of access 
covers pretrial proceedings, and a few of these cases have 
specifically involved preliminary hearings. See, e. g., State v. 
Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983) (preliminary hearing to 
determine probable cause); Petition of the Daily Item, 310 Pa. 
Super. 222, 456 A.2d 580 (1983) (same); Kearns-Tribune Co. v. 
Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984) (same). Other state courts, 
however, have held that the right of access does not extend to 
'~ 
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preliminary hearings. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 
338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983): Steinle v. Lollis, 279 S.C. 375, 307 
S.E.2d 230 (1983). This case, petr suggests, offers an 
opportunity to resolve this issue. 
In addition, petr argues that those courts that recognize 
the right of access are in disarray over the question of when 
closure is permissible. The CA9 has held in Brooklier, supra, 
that the First Amendment permits closure only when the defendant 
shows a substantial probability of irreparable damage if the 
proceedings are open, a substantial probability that alternatives 
to closure will be ineffective, and a substantial probability 
that closure will effectively protect the defendant's rights. 
The CA3 in Criden, supra, required the defendant to show that 
closure is "necessary" to preserve his rights. The CAS, however, 
requires only that the defendant show that his right to a fair 
trial is likely to be prejudiced unless proceedings are closed, 
that alternatives to closure are inadequate, and that closure 
will probably be ineffective. Chagra, supra. And the CA2 has 
adopted an even more relaxed standard, requiring only a 
"signficant risk of prejudice" and a finding that closure is 
"preferable" to available alternatives. Herald Co., supra, at 
100. The state courts, petr contends, have adopted a variety of 
disparate standards. 
Petr also argues that the analysis employed by the 
California Supreme Court in rejecting a right of access to 
preliminary hearings is inconsistent with this Court's recent 
decisions regarding the right of access to criminal proceedings 
-8-
(Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, supra; Globe Newspaper 
~o., supra; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.s. 555 
(1980)). These opinions have not tended to stress the historical 
question whether a particular proceeding has traditionally been 
open or closed, but have instead focused on the function of 
public access to criminal proceedings. Public access, the Court 
has reasoned, helps discourage misconduct on the part of the 
participants, educates the public about the workings of the 
judicial system, reduces public distrust of the system, and 
serves a therapeutic or cathartic function by allowing the 
community to observe justice being done. These functional 
reasons for access are as applicable to preliminary hearings as 
to full trials; indeed, the preliminary hearing may often be the 
most important proceeding in a case, and important questions may 
be resolved at the preliminary stage. Accordingly, the right of 
access should extend to preliminary hearings. 
Finally, petr contends that the statutory standard devised 
by the California courts is insufficient to protect the 
constitutional right of access. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, supra, the Court stated that closure of a 
proceeding "must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs 
the value of openness." 104 s.ct., at 824. The Court stressed 
that closure is permissible only when it "is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest." Ibid. The loose standard articulated by the 
California Supreme Court, permitting closure based only on a 
showing of reasonable likelihood that open proceedings will 
I 
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preiudice the defendant, does not live up to these strict 
standards. 
Several members of the press, as amici curiae, have 
submitted a brief in support of the petition for certiorari. 
They argue that the preliminary hearing is a critical phase in 
the criminal process, arid that a right of access to the 
preliminary hearing serves precisely the same First Amendment 
values as does the right of access to the trial itself. 
Accordingly, the California court erred in rejecting a right of 
access. In addition, amici assert that the standard for closure 
devised by the California court is so loose as to assure closure 
whenever a defendant requests it. 
4. DISCUSSION: Under ordinary standards, this case is 
~~~~· Petr ultimately obtained access to the transcript of the 
preliminary proceeding, and the criminal trial ended long ago. ---------- '---------Mootness, however, is no obstacle to review of this case: most of 
---·-
this Court's right of access cases have concerned proceedings 
that are completed, but the Court has decided them on the ground 
that they are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 u.s., at 596: Richmond Newspapers, 448 
u.s., at 563: Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368, 377-378 
(1979). This reasoning would seem equally applicable here. 
Petr's claims of conflict among the state and federal 
courts, however, are somewhat exaggerated. Most of the cases 
petr cites as upholding a right of access to pretrial proceedings 
deal with proceedings that occur after a grand jury or magistrate 
.______ ____..,.. ~
has determined that the charges against the defen ant are 
I 
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supported by probable cause--for example, suppression hearings 
and jury selection proceedings. All of the federal cases cited 
by petr fall into this category, as do most of the state cases. 
~ . . h . ~ Prel1m1nary ear1ngs, however, present problems different 
from the other pretrial proceedings with which the cases petr 
cites are concerned. The preliminary hearing serves essentially\ 
the s~ function as proceedings before the grand jur . the 
. -------- -~ . . 
prosecution presents 1ts case, and some neutral dec1s1onmaker 
(the magistrate in a preliminary hearing, or a grand jury where 
an ind ic tmen t is required) determines whether this essentially 
one-sided presentation establishes probable cause for further 
-------- 7 
proceedings against the defendant. This Court's pr~es ~ 
establishing a right of access to trials (and to such pretrial ~~ 
proceedings as voir dire, see Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior 
Court, supra) don't necessarily require that the same analysis be 
applied to preliminary hearings or grand jury proceedings, where 
the traditional concern for secrecy reflects a well-founded fear 
that the public may mistake the evidence introduced to establish 
probable cause as proof of guilt. 
Nonetheless, petr does cite two cases from state courts of 
last resort that decide the right of access question in a manner 
contrary to the decision of the California Supreme Court in this 
case. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983); 
Kearns-Tribune Co. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984). I don't 
believe, however, that these decisions entail the sort of 
conflict that this Court need resolve. In both cases, the courts 
explicitly recognized that this Court's decisions leave it 
-11-
uncertain whether the First Amendment right of access extends to 
the preliminary hearing; and although the courts expressed the 
view that the First Amendment right does apply to preliminary 
hearings, they carefully held that this result follows from their 
state constitutions regardless of whether the federal 
constitutional right of access is implicated. In addition, both 
courts held that the right of access was adequately protected by 
a standard allowing closure on a showing of a reasonable 
likelihood of prejudice--precisely the same standard arrived at 
on nonconstitutional grounds by the California court. Given that 
all three courts arrived at the same standard on grounds other 
than the First Amendment, the conflict among their unnecessary 
pronouncements on the existence of a First Amendment right of 
access does not strike me as one that must be resolved. 
Although I do not believe the conflict alleged by petr is 
independently certworthy, the issue presented is one that the 
Court might want to resolve. There are important distinctions 
~---------·-· ........ 
between the preliminary hearing involved in this case ~nd_ the 
~ 
proceedings to which the Court has recognized a right of access, 
-------but petr is correct in noting that many of the qoncerns 
underlying the right of access to trials are equally applicable 
where preliminary hearings are concerned. In addition, petr 
correctly points out that the courts have been somewhat confused 
about the proper formulation of the test for closure of a 
proceeding to which there is a right of access. Some courts have 
spoken of substantial probabilities of irreparable injury, others 
of reasonable likelihoods, and still others of "necessity." 
l 
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Whether these distinctions make a difference in practice is 
unclear, but some courts seem to believe that they do. Thus, if 
the Court is inclined to continue its project of expanding the 
right of access, and if it believes that the "reasonable 
likelihood of prejudice" standard for closure is inadequate to 
protect that right (or that the proper standard requires 
clarification), a grant here would be a possibility (although a 
CFR would be a prerequisite). 
Given the distinction between the preliminary hearing and 
the other proceedings to which the Court has recognized a right 
of access, the absence of a square conflict, and the significant 
level of protection of public access afforded by the Califo~i~ 
court on nonconstitutional grounds, however, I recommend~. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is no response. 
May 15, 1985 Nelson Opin in petn. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell February 22, 1986 
From: Bob 
No.84-1560 
THE PRESS ENTERPRISE CO. v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA 
To be argued, Wednesday, February 26, 1986 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Whether the public's right of access to criminal proceed-
ings, guaranteed by the United States Constitution First Amend-
ment, extends to pretrial proceedings, in particular, preliminary 
~ hearings. 
"5 ~ ~ It> If-' 'R t. K ~ ~ 5/C 1-~ 1-v-c..~ t.-1 ,;t:-
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The defendant opposed the motion. Although the su_Eerior court 
trial judge found that the information contained in the tran-
script was neither inflammatory or exciting, he nonetheless found 
that there was a "reasonable likelihood that release of all or 
any part of the transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a 
fair trial." The trial court, therefore, denied the request to 
unseal the transcripts. On appeal, the court of appeals held 
that there was no constitutional right of access to preliminary 
hearings. The California Supreme Court agreed, and further con-
- ------- - ------·--- - ,, 
close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likeli-
hood of substantial prejudice which would impinge upon the ---- ____ .........___ 
to a fair trial." fi;;ti on 8ijH provides in pertinent part: 
"The examination shall be open and public. Howev-
er, upon the request of the defendant and a finding by ~--~-~~/L 
the magistrate that exclt;tsion of the public is ''neces- <C-- c ..... --~r_:~ J 
s~" in order to protec't the defendant's r ignt to a ~)
fair and impartial trial, the magistrate shall exclude ~~ 
from the examination every person except the clerk, 
court reporter .... " ' ( r"'·'11.... ... 1 u-f 
~--" 
II. DISCUSSION ~'" 
I am by far more persuaded by the arguments advanced by 
petrs and amici than I am by respondents in this case. Virtually 
all of the policies that favor a constitutional right of access 
to criminal trials, support a right of access here. Further, I 
find such a holding consistent with y~ views as expressed in 
v"" Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), and other free 
V"' 
press opinions that you have joined. Press Enterprise Co. v. Su-
/ 
perior Court, 464 u.s. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superi-
page 4. 
or Court, 457 u.s. 596 (1982). Indeed, the California Supreme 
Court in this very case pointed out that it acknowledged the ben-
efit in the openness in such a proceeding, and the similarities 
between a preliminary hearing and a trial: 
"Exposure of government functions to public view 
serves societal interests in a democratic government. 
Open preliminary hearings guard against persecution and 
favoritism, increase public awareness of the judicial 
process, inspire confidence in the criminal justice 
system, and serve the cathartic needs of the community. 
Preliminary hearings are an important step in the accu-
satorial process. There are many similarities to tri-
al; witnesses may be cross-examined, each side has an 
incentive to prevail, and the hearing may reveal weak-
nesses in the prosecution or defense, forecasting the 
ultimate disposition. 
Often the preliminary hearing turns out to be the 
only judicial proceeding of a substantial importance 
that takes place during a criminal prosecution because 
so many cases are disposed of without trial. The hear-
ing often provides the forum for issues involving po-
lice misconduct and exclusion of evidence."l 
This latter point comes close to tracking your point in Gan-
nett that "suppression hearings often are as important as the 
trial which may follow." Gannett, supra, at 397 n.l. Indeed, here 
lpetr suggests that suppression hearings are a regular bill of 
fare at preliminary hearings in California. Indeed respondent 
Diaz claims that often charges are dismissed or reduced in a 
significant number of cases following the preliminary hearing and 
that those "redu~tions are often obtained by suppressing evidence 
and otherwise exposing holes in the prosecution's case" rather 
than by proving an affirmative defense. Later, however, 
respondent Diaz takes issue with petr's claim that suppression 
motions are "a standard part of the bill of fare" of preliminary .L 
hearings in California. Diaz contends that it is "undeniably ) cp.s ~r 
true" that preliminary hearings ~be ''joined with suppression ~
hearings, motions to dismiss and other motions that raise ~. ___ ___ I 
co~tutiona~ •... However, the hearings remain 
distinct and it should be possible to separate th t stimony, 
cl e prelim'nar h aring, and open the qth_ers." This may be 
a fertile ground or questioning at oral argument. 
page 5. 
it can be said that access is more important because no trial may ~ 
follow. Petr also points out that at the preliminary hearing the 
defendant has a right to present an affirmative defense such as 
"-------~ 
alibi, self-defense, or entrapment, and may develop that defense 
through cross examination or by calling witnesses. California 
applies its Evidence Code, with a minor exception, to the prelim-
inary hearing. Constitutional objections can be raised to the 
admissibility of confessions and the admissibility of eye-witness 
identifications. Finally, the magistrate has powers similar to a 
judge at trial. 
Respondents arguments on the other hand consist largely of 
arguments that could similarly be applied to trials in general. 
-------------~.__.....____~------------------
For example, respondent Diaz argues that the cathartic reaction 
~ of the community comes from seeing harsh penalties not from ob-
serving trials; and that indeed the public might become enraged 
to be able to know that at a preliminary hearing one can get off 
on a technicality. Many other of respondents' arguments simply 
come too late in the day to rebut the benefit of public access to 
this kind of a procedure. 
Other arguments, such as the fact that often only the prose-
cuter's evidence is presented and that therefore the public 
would be confused by allowing reporting on the event, strike me 
as arguments in favor of public education, rather than closure of 
preliminary hearings. On the other hand, a constant barrage of 
negative information may be more difficult to counterbalance than 
reporting of both sides at trial. Respondent Superior Court's 
argument that a right of access here will lead inevitably to ac-
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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cess to such things as prosecutor's files and grand jury proceed-____..__ 
ings also strikes me as just silly. 
My reading of the briefs does not leave the impression that I'VtA!J f-
the preliminary hearing in California is akin to a grand jury ~6.... 
investigation, and any opinion would probably want to make that G-/~ 
clear. First, the preliminary hearing is not an arm of the pros-~~ 
ecution, and the focus of the inquiry is to test the evidence 
against the defendant, not to produce evidence against the de-
fendant. 
The only question from reading the earlier cases is whether 
you believe it important that there be some solid tradition and 
history of open pretrial proceedings. In Gannett, you were unde-
terred by the majority's analysis that pretrial proceedings were 
traditionally not open. On the other hand, the dissent in that 
case distinguished suppression hearings from those being dis-
cussed in the majority. Indeed it declared "It is significant 
that the sources upon which the Court relies do not concern sup-
pression hearings. They concern hearings to determine probable 
cause to bind a defendant over for trial. E.g., Indictable Of-
fenses Act, 11 & 12 Viet. ch. 42, §§17, 19 (1848); Cal. Penal 
Code Ann. §868 (West Supp. 1979)." Gannett, 443 u.s., at 437 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
In a well done brief, Amicus American Newspaper Publishers ________. 
Association, et al., points out that under English law the magis---
trate was originally an arm of the prosecution and involved in 
investigating crime. Thus, to say that those proceedings were 
closed is not helpful because those proceedings were simply not 
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analogous to the preliminary hearing at issue here. While the 
Colonies apparently followed the English practice, pre-trial pro-
ceedings became "decidedly public affairs" in most American ju-
risdictions. In the few American jurisdictions in which the 
court retained authority to close pretrial proceedings to the 
public, the power remained "in judicial dormancy and day-to-day 
disuse." Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 u.c.L.A. L. 
Rev. 397, 407 (1961). Geis goes on to point out that an excep-
tion was a small bloc of states, California among them, which 
adopted a unique provision of the Field Code that permitted clos-
ing the hearing on the request of the defendant. Petr contends, 
then, that a presumption of openness attends the preliminary 
hearing. This presumption of openness can be met by the point 
\..____-.- made by the majority opinion in Gannett, "The petitioner and ami-
ci appear to argue that since exclusion of members of the public 
is relatively rare, there must be a constitutional public right 
to a public trial. This argument, however, confuses the exist-
ence of a constitutional right with the common-law tradition of 
open civil and criminal proceedings." Gannett, supra, 443 u.s. at 
389. Thus, the opennenss of the pre-trial hearing perhaps cannot 
be compared to the openness of the trial for which "historical 
evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our or-
ganic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England 
had long been presumptively open. This is no quirk of history; 
rather, it has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute 
of an Anglo-American trial." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virgin-
ia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 ( 1980) (Opinion of Burger, J.) • 
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In the end, I think that the larger historical point should 
not focus on the history behind particular proceedings, but rath-
er on the fact that the roots of this country's judicial proc-
esses are set in the soil of openness. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v~ 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.l3 (rejecting contention that 
because trials involving testimony by minors in sex-crime cases 
has not been traditionally open, then there is no constitutional 
requirement that they be open). When open procedures further the 
interests that led our ancestors to open trials, then the consti-
tutional protection should be there afforded as well. When a pro-
ceeding bears such a similarity in form and consequence to the 
actual trial itself, I am not persuaded that any historical argu-
ment should stand in the way of a recognition of a constitutional 
~ right. I think that such a view is consistent with the tenor of 
v"" -- ---· ~ --··- ---
your dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 u.s. 843 
------------~~ 
(1974). 
If you agree that the First Amendment protects the right of 
" 
access to these procedures, then the Court can remand to the Cal- ~~4~~ 
ifornia Court to be given an opportunity to construe its statute 
---~-----.....__.--"' 
in conformity with the recognition of the constitutional right. 
- -----·--·-------
The California Court required simply a showing of a "likelihood 
of ~s~a~~dice" in the 
indeed very close to the standard 
fair trial context. This is 
concur-
renee in Gannett (whether fair trial 'likely to be jeopardized") -;'~ 
and you may think that that is all that need be said on it. The 
California Court here, however, although it cited to your concur-
renee in Gannett, arguably did not require a consideration of 
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alternatives, a requirement that the exclusion be only as great 
as necessary to meet the goal of achieving a fair trial, and a 
requirement that the press be heard, all of which you made refer-
ence to in Gannett. Thus, I think you would even want to reverse ~ 
based on the standard applied below. On the other hand it may 
simply be required that this Court provide some guidance as to 
the type of balancing that must be done in a case such as this, 
and leave to the California Court the precise implementation of 
that balancing. 
Because Justice Blackmun, as pointed out in the opinion 
below, adopted a standard in his Gannett dissent that would make 
it much more d iff icul t for an accused to have a trial closed, 
~~
this case has the potential for resurrecting the difference be-
tween your approach and that of the dissenters in Gannett. 
To avoid having to decide that issue, the Court may simply 
want to remand with the general guidance provided by a case such 
- v. ~ as Waller v. Georgia, 104 s. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984), a Sixth 
~ 
/ Amendment case which nonetheless borrowed from the First Amend-
ment principles of earlier cases. In that case you wrote: 
"Under Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to 
close the hearing must advance an overriding interest 
that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no 
broader than necessary to protect that interest, the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to 
closing the proceeding, and it must make findings ade-
quate to support the closure." 
I would go further than this, however. If the Court finds a 
constitutional right of access to these pretrial hearings, I do 
not think it should avoid the question of the standard to be ap-
page 10. 
plied in reconciling the constitutional right of access with the 
constitutional right to a fair trial. 
I I I. CONCLUSION 
I recommend that you reverse the judgment of the California 
Supreme Court, and offer guidance to lower courts on the proper 
standard to be used to reconcile the competing constitutional 
rigqts at issue in a case such as this. 
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84-1560 Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court 
(Calif. Supreme Court - Argued 2/26/86 
MEMO TO BOB: 
This case presents an interesting and difficult 
question: 
"Whether the public's right of access to 
criminal proceedings, guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, extends to preliminary hearings of 
the kind authorized under California law?" 
As 1 will want your views, Bob, I will only 
identify my primary concern - as I now understand this 
case. It pertains to the nature and purpose of the 
preliminary hearing in California criminal procedure. 
Accordingly to the California Supreme Court, §869 of the 
California Code was amended to delete the defendant's 
absolute right to closure, and to establish a right of 
access to preliminary hearings. As amended, §868 reads as - , . 
follows: 
"The examination shall be open and public. 
However, upon the request of the defendant and a 
finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the 
public is necessary in order to protect the 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial, 
the magistrate shall exclude from the 
examination [all but certain enumerated 
officials, defendant and his counse 1, and the 
prosecuting witness and a friend]." 
If in fact, as is suggested, California 
preliminary hearings are analogous to a grand jury 
proceedings, it would be easy to affirm the decision of 
the California Supreme Court that the press properly may 
be excluded. If, on the other hand, the purpose and 
nature of preliminary hearings is as described in the 
briefs of petitioner, and particularly the briefs of the 
amici, (See, e.g., brief by Baker & Hostetler), such a 
hearing in effect is a preliminary trial. Amici briefs 
set forth at length the "rights" provided the defendant at 
such a hearing, and they do resemble - to a large extent -
the same rights enjoyed by a defendant at a trial. 
In this case the preliminary hearing extended 
over a 41-day period. The magistrate (these hearings are 
conducted before a magistrate with no jury) denied press 
access, period on the motion of defendant, throughout this 
entire period. The magistrate ruled that if the hearin_g , 
was open to the press and the public, the pretrial 
publicity - of this murder case - would make it virtually 
impossible for defendant to obtain a fair trial. 
It is not entirely clear that the finding by the 
magistrate complied literally with the provisions of §868. 
Amici briefs state, in varying language, that preliminary 
hearings - although their purpose is only to determine 
"probable cause" - often result in a final disposition -
that is, a decision not to prosecute or a plea bargain. 
The best brief on behalf of the respondent is that by the 
County Counsel, Gerald Geerlings. See his description of 
the pretrial procedure that he characterizes as 
"functionally different than a trial and protects 
different societal goals". 
The parties seem to agree that there are three 
relevant decisions of this Court. As 1 recall, the only 
case in which we have considered specifically a pretrial 
proceedings is Gannett v. de Pasquale, 443 u.s. 368 
(1979). The proceedings at issue were on the familiar 
motion to suppress evidence. It is not at all clear to me 
that a motion to suppress is fairly analogous to the type 
of preliminary hearing that prevails in California. 
1 am far from at rest in this case. As 1 think - " 
my votes in other cases indicate, 1 am generally inclined 
toward the openness of trial procedures. Yet, it is 
perfectly clear that in some cases a pretrial procedure 
can result in pervasive publicity that makes a subsequent 
trial difficult if not impossible. Thus, there are 
substantial competing rights. A defendant certainly 
should be protected by the type of publicity that may 
prevents a fair trial, even where the case can be 
transfer red for trial to a different area of the state. 
On the other hand, as some of the briefs emphasize, the 
presence of the media often assure fair procedures and 
serve a public purpose. 
This case should be written narrowly on the 
basis of the rather unique California procedure. 1 infer 
that the grand jury is not used in criminal cases in 
California, and that the issue of probable cause is 
determined - or may be determined in appropriate cases -
in a preliminary hearing as a substitute for an 
information or a grand jury. 
Bob, 1 will not want a long bench memo. 1 would 
like a summary of your views, and your recommendation. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1560 
PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, ETC., PETITIONER 
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR 
THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CALIFORNIA ~ -
[June-, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide wgether p tition~s a 
First Amendment ri ht of access to transcripts of a prelimi-
nary hearing growing out of a crimina prosecutiOn. 
I 
On December 23, 1981 , the State of California filed a com-
plaint in the Riverside County Municipal Court, charging 
Robert Diaz with twelve counts of murder and seeking the 
death penalty. The complaint alleged that Diaz, a nurse, 
murdered twelve patients by administering massive doses of 
the heart drug lidocaine. The preliminary hearing on the 
complaint commenced on July 6, 1982. Diaz moved to ex-
clude the public from the proceedings under California Penal 
Code § 868, which requires such proceedings to be open 
unless "exclusion of the public is necessa'ry in order to protect 
the defendant's right to a fair trial." 1 The magistrate 
' Section 868, as amended in 1982, provides in full: 
"The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of 
the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is 
necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the magis-
trate shall exclude from the examination every person except the clerk, 
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granted the unopposed motion, finding that closure was nec-
essary because the case had attracted national publicity and 
"only one side may get reported in the media." J. A. 23a. 
The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days. Most of 
the testimony an theevi ence presented bYthe State was 
medical and scientific; the remainder consisted of testimony 
by personnel who worked with Diaz on the shifts when the 
twelve patients died. Diaz did not introduce any evidence, 
but his counsel subjected!iiOStO~gorous 
cross-examination. Diaz was held to answer on all charges. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner Press-Enterprise 
Com: asked that the transcri t of the roceedings be re-
leased. The magistrate re sed an sealed e record. 
OnJanuary 21, 1983, the State moved in Super-ior Court to 
have the transcripts of the preliminary hearing released to 
the public; petitioner later joined in support of the motion. 
Diaz opposed the motion, contending that release of the tran-
scripts would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Su-
perior Court found that the information in the transcript was 
"as factual as it could be," and that the facts were neither "in-
flammatory" nor "exciting" but there was, nonetheless, "a 
ney General, the district attorney of the county, the investigating officer, 
the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the witness is testify-
ing, the defendant and his or her counsel, the officer having the defendant 
in custody and a person chosen by the prosecuting witness who is not him-
self or herself a witness but who is present to provide the prosecuting wit-
ness moral support, provided that the person so chosen shall not discuss 
prior to or during the preliminary examination the testimony of the pros-
ecuting witness with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who 
is a witness in the examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the 
right to exclude witnesses as provided in Section 687 of the Penal Code." 
Before 1982, the statute gave the defendant the unqualified right to close 
the proceedings. After the California Supreme Court rejected a First 
Amendment attack on the old statute in San Jose Mercury-News v. 
Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), the California legislature amended 
the statute to include the present requirement that the hearing be closed 
only upon a finding by the magistrate that closure is "necessary in order to 
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial." 
84-1560--0PINION 
PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 3 
reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of the 
transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial." 
J. A. 60. 
Petitioner then filed a peremptory writ of mandate with 
the Court of Appeal. That court originally denied the writ 
but, after being so ordered by the California Supreme Court, 
set the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, Diaz waived his 
right to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the tran-
script. After holding that the controversy was not moot, the 
Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate. 
The California Supreme Court thereafter denied petition-
er's peremptory writ of mandate, holding that there is no 
general First Amendment right of access to preliminary 
hearings. The court reasoned that the right of access to 
criminal proceedings recognized in Press-Ent'erprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U. S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enter-prise 1), 
and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596 
(1982), extended only to actual criminal trials. 37 Cal. 3d 
at 776. Furthermore, the reasons that had been ass,erted for 
closing the proceedings in Press Enterprise I and Globe-the 
interests of witnesses and other third parties-were not the 
same as the right asserted in this case-the defendant's right 
to a fair and impartial trial by a jury uninfluenced by news 
accounts. 
Having found no general First Amendment right of access, 
the court then considered the circumstances in which the clo-
sure would be proper under the California access statute, 
Penal Code § 868. Under the statute, the court reasoned, if 
the defendant establishes a "reasonable likelihood of substan-
tial prejudice" the burden shifts to the prosecution or the 
media to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there 
is no such reasonable probability of prejudice. 37 Cal. 3d at 
782. 
~anted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1985). We 
( ever e. 
84-156~0PINION 
4 PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
II 
We must first consider whether we have (urisdicti~ under 
Article III , § 2 of the Constitution. In this Cour(petitioner 
challenges the Superior Court's original refusal to release the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing. As noted above, the 
specific relief petitioner seeks has already been granted-the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing was released after Diaz 
waived his right to a jury trial. Similar circumstan e 
presented in Globe Newspaper, supra, at 603, and an nett v 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368,(377-378 (1979), whe eld 
that because controversies i volving public access to judicial 
proceedings are "capable of repetition, yet evading review," 
such controversies do not become moot simply because the 
relief sought has been granted. Globe and Gannett, there-
fore, require the conclusion that this case is not moot. Ac-
cordingly, we turn to the merits. 
III 
It is important to identify precisely what the California 
Supreme Court decided: -- ·--
". . . we conclude that the magistrate shall close the pre-
liminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of 
substantial prejudice which would impinge upon the 
right to a fair trial. Penal code section 868 makes clear 
that the primary right is the ngfit to a fair trial and that 
the public's right of access must give way when there is a 
conflict." 
It is difficult to disagree in the abstract with that court's 
analysis balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against 
the public right of access. It is also important to remember 
that these interests are not necessarily inconsistent. 
Plainly, the· defen ant as a ng t to a air tnal ut, as we 
have repeatedly recognized, one of the important means of 
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The right to an open public trial is a shared right of the ac-
cused and the public, the common concern being the assur-
ance of fairness. Only recently, in Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U. S. 39 (1984), for example, we considered whether the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to an open trial prevented 
the closure of a suppression hearing over the defendant's ob-
jection. We noted that the First Amendment right of access 
would in most instances attach to such proceedings and that 
"the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less 
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment 
right of the press and public." I d., at 46. When the defend-
ant objects to the closure of a suppression hearing, therefore, 
the hearing must be open unless the party seeking to close 
the hearing advances an overriding interest that is likely to 
be prejudiced. !d., at 47. 
Here, unlike Waller, the right asserted is not the defend-
ant'SSixth--Aii1eildment right to a public trial since the de-
fendant requested a closed preliminary hearing. Instead, 
the right asserted here is that of the press and public under 
the First Amendment. The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the First Amendment was not implicated because 
the proceeding was not a criminal trial, but a preliminary 
hearing. However, the First Amendment question cannot 
be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i. e., "trial" 
or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary hearing 
functions much like a full scale trial. 
In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right 
of access to criminal proceedings, our decisions have empha-
sized two complementary considerations. First, because a 
"'tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of 
experience'" Globe Newpaper, 457 U. S., at 605 (quoting 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 589 
(1980) (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment)), we 
have considered whether the place and process has histori-
cally been open to the press and general public. 
I 
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In Press-Enterprise I, for example, we observed "that, 
since tlf'e develo ment of triill. b~ jury, the process of selec-
tion of juror ha presumptively)_ been a public process with 
excej)tions on y or goo cause shown." 464 U. S., at 501. 
In Richmond Newspapers, we reviewed some of the early 
historyof"Englailcl'S'open trials from the day when a trial was 
much like a "town meeting." In the days before the Norman 
Conquest, criminal cases were brought before "moots," a col-
lection of the freemen in the community. The public trial, 
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice" in Eng-
land, was recognized early on in the colonies. There were 
risks, of course, inherent in such a "town meeting" trial-the 
risk that it might become a gathering moved by emotions or 
passions growing from the nature of a crime; a "lynch mob" 
ambience is hardly conducive to calm, reasoned decisionmak-
ing based on evidence. Plainly the modern trial with jurors 
open to interrogation for possible bias is a far cry from the 
"town meeting trial" of ancient English practice. Yet even 
our modern procedural protections have their origin in the 
ancient common law principle which provided, not for closed 
proceedings, but rather for rules of conduct for those who at-
tend trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 567. 
Second, public access to the affairs of government does not j 
merit Constitutional protection unless it plays a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question. Globe Newspaper, 457 U. S., at 606. Although 
many governmental processes operate best under public 
scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that the~ 
are some kinds of overnment o erations that would be to-
ta y frustrated if conducted open y. c ass1c example is 
that "the proper functioning of our cgTand jury sys§fuj de-
pends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings." Doug-
las Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211 , 218 
(1979). Other proceedings plainly require public access. In 
Press-Enterprise I, we summarized the holdings of prior 
cases, noting that openness in criminal trials , including the 
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selection of jurors, "enhances both the basic fairness of the 
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to 
public confidence in the system." 464 U. S., at 501. 
If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests 
of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of 
public access attaches. The right of access, however, has 
never been absolute. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Supenor 
Court, 457 ~6, 606 (1981). While open criminal pro-
ceedings give assurances of fairness to both the public and 
the accused, there are some limited circumstances in which 
the right of the accused toa Iair~dermined by 
publicity. 2 In sue cases, e tria court must etermine 
w ether the situation is such that the rights of the accused 
override the qualified First Amendment right of access. In 
Press-Enterprise I we stated: 
"the presumption may be overcome only by an overrid-
ing interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along 
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly en-
tered." 464 U. S. at 501. 
IV 
A 
The considerations that led the Court. to apply the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe and the selection of jurors in Press 
Enterprise I lead us to conclude that the ri ht of access ap-
plies to preliminary earings as conducted in alifornia. 
- ---------- -
2 Similarly, the rights of those other than the accused may be impli-
cated. The protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and 
embarrassment of public scrutmy may create a compelling need to close 
certain aspects of a criminal proceeding. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-610 (1982). --
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First, there has been a tradition of accessibility to prelimi-
nary hearings of the type conducted in California. Although 
grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed to the 
public and the accused, preliminary hearings conducted be-
fore neutral and detached magistrates have been open to the 
public. Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for 
treason, for exam le with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as 
trial judge, th probable cause earmg was held in the Hall of 
the House of De egates m 1rgmia, t e court room being too 
small to accommodate the crush of interested citizens. 
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (CCD. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 
692)-:--Yrom Burr until the present day, the near uniform 
practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct pre-
~
lim~ hearings in opef!_court. 3 As we noted in Gannett, 
3 The vast majority of states considering the issue have concluded that 
the same tradition of accessibility that applies to criminal trials applies to 
preliminary proceedings. See, e. g., Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 
281 'Ark. 152, 662 S. E. 2d 174 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 
569, 202 S. E. 2d 815, 819 (1982); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 
P. 2d 49, 56 (Hawaii 1978); State ex rei. Post-Tribune Publ. Co., 412 N. E. 
2d 748 (Ind. 1980); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S. W. 2d 749, 
752 (Ky. App. 1980); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court; 608 P. 2d 116 
(Mont. 1980); Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, 406 A. 
2d 137 (NH 1979); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983); Westchester Rock-
land Newspapers v. Leggett, 399 N. E. 2d 518, 523 (NY 1979); Minot Daily 
News v. Holum, 380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); State ex rei. Dayton News-
papers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N. E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1976); Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 503, 387 A. 2d 425, 434 (1978); Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984); Herald Association, 
Inc. v. Ellison, 419 A. 2d 323, 326 (Vermont 1980); Federated Publica· 
tions, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P. 2d 440 (1980); State ex rei . 
Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S. E. 2d 544 (W. Va. 1980); Williams v. 
Stafford, 589 P. 2d 322 (Wyo. 1979). Compare In re Midland Publishing, 
420 Mich. 148, 173 (1984) (proceedings leading to a person's indictment 
have not been open to the public). 
Other courts have noted that some pretrial proceedings have no histori-
cal counterpart, but, given the importance of the pretrial proce~ding to the 
criminal trial, the traditional right of access should still apply. See, e. g., 
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several states following the original New York Field Code of 
Criminal Procedure published in 1850 have allowed prelimi-
nary hearings to be closed on the motion of the accused. 443 
U. S., at 390-391. But even in these states the proceedings 
are presumptively open to the public and are closed only for 
cause shown.~ Open preliminary hearings, therefore, have 
been accorded "'the favorable judgment of experience."' 
Globe, supra, at 605. 
The second question is whether public access to _.grelimi-
nary hearings as tney are coffiftiCfea1n California plays a par-
ticularly s1gnifican pos11ve ro e in the actual functioning of 
the process. We have already determined in Richmond 
Newspapers, Globe, and Press Enterprise I that public access 
t.o criminal trials and the selection of jurors is essential to the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system. California 
preliminary hearings are sufficiently like a trial to justify the 
same conclusion. 
In California, to bring a felon to trial, the prosecutor has a 
choice ofSeeuring a grand jury indictment or a finding of 
probable cause following a preliminary hearing. But even 
when the accused has been indicted by a grand jury, how-
ever, he has an ab olute right to an elaborate preliminary 
hearin before a neutral magistrate. Hawkins v. Superior 
Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa 
1983); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N. W. 2d 550 
(Minn. 1983); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S. E. 2d 
915 (Va. 1981). 
'See State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P. 2d 206 (1957); Azbill v. 
Fisher, 442 P. 2d 916 (Nev. 1968). Although Arizona, Iowa, Montana, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah have closure statutes based on the 
Field Code, see Gannett, 443 U. S., at 391, in each of these states the 
supreme court has found either a common law or state constitutitional right 
of the public to attend pretrial proceedings. See Phoenix Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257 (1966); Iowa Freedom of Information 
Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Great Falls Tribune v. 
District Court, 608 P. 2d 116 (Mont. 1980); Minot Daily News v. Holum, 
380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A. 2d 318 (Pa. 
1980); Keams-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984). 
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Court 22 Cal. 3d 584 (1978). The accused has the right to 
ersonall appean t the hearing, to be represented by coun-
se , o cross-exa ine hostile witnesses, to present exculpa-
tory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence. 
Cal. Penal Code§§ 859-866, 1538.5. If the magistrate deter-
mines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over 
for trial; such a finding leads to a guilty plea in the majority of 
cases. 
It is true that unlike a criminal trial, the California prelimi-
nary hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused 
and the adjudication is before a magistrate or other judicial 
officer without a jury. But these features, standing alone, 
do not make public access any less essential to the proper 
functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice 
process. Because of its extensive scope, the preliminary 
hearing is often the fi~~y(nd most important step in the crim-
inal proceeding. SeeVWaller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 46-47 
(1984). As the California Supreme Court stated in San Jose 
Mercury News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510 
(1982), the preliminary hearing in many cases provides "the 
sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice 
system." See also Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572. 
Similarly, the absence of a jury, long recognized as "an in-
estimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous pros-
ecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge," 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159 (1968), makes the 
importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even 
more significant. "People in an open society do not demand 
infallability from their institutions, but it is difficult for them 
to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Rich-
mond Newspapers, supra, at 572. 
Denying the transcri.E_ts . of a .g_jay preliminary hearing 
would frustrate what we have characterized as the "commu-
nity therapeutic value" of openness. I d., at 570. Criminal 
acts, especially certain violent crimes, provoke public con-
cern, outrage, and hostility. "When the public is aware that 
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the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is 
functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable 
reactions and emotions." Press Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at 
509. See also H. Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-131 
(1956); T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959). In sum, 
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not ac-
tually attending trials can have confidence that stand-
ards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge 
that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that estab-
lished procedures are being followed and that deviations 
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the 
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of 
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system." 
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at 508. (emphasis in 
original). ~ 
We therefore conclude that the qualified First Amendment 
right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary 
hearings as they are conducted in California. 
B 
Since a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches 
to preliminary hearings in California under Cal. Penal Code 
§ § 858 et seq., the proceedings cannot be closed unless spe-
cific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that 
"closure is essential to preserve higher values and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest." Press-Enterprise I, 
464 U. S., at 510. If the interest asserted is the right of the 
accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed 
only if specific findings are made demonstrating that first, 
there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to 
a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity and, second, rea-
sonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the 
defendant's free trial rights. See id.; Richmond N ewspa-
pers, supra, at 581. 
The California Supreme Court, interpreting its access stat-) 
ute, concluded "that the magistrate shall close the prelimi-
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nary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of substan-
tial prejudice." 37 Cal. 3d, at 781. As the court itself ~ 
acknowledged the "reasonable likelihood" test places a lesser 
burden on the defendant than the "substantial probability" 
test which we hold is called for by the First Amendment. 
See id.; see also id., at 783 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Moreover, that court failed to consider whether alter-
natives short of complete closure would have protected the 
inte ests of the accused. 
In Gannett we observed that: 
~hc1ty concerning pretrial suppression hearings such 
as the one involved in the present case poses special 
risks of unfairness. The whole purpose of such hearings 
is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence ? 
and insure that this evidence does not become known to 
the jury. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368. Public-
ity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing, 
however, could influence public opinion against a defend-
ant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory informa-
tion wholly inadmissible at the actual trial." 
443 U. S., at 378. 
But this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify re-
fusing public access to hearings on every motion to suppress. 
Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some circum-
stances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowl- " 
edge of the case would disable them from rendering an impar-
tial verdict. And even if closure were justified for the 
hearings on a motion to suppress, closure of an entire 41 day 
proceeding would rarely be warranted. The First Amend-
ment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory 
assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that 
right. And any limitation "must be narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest." Press Enterprise, supra, at 510. 
The standard applied by the California Supreme Court 
failed to consider the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
.. 
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California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1560 
PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, ETC., PETITIONER 
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR 
THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CALIFORNIA 
[June-, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner has a 
First Amendment right of access to transcripts of a prelimi-
nary hearing growing out of a criminal prosecution. 
I 
On December 23, 1981, the State of California filed a com-
plaint in the Riverside County Municipal Court, charging 
Robert Diaz with twelve counts of murder and seeking the 
death penalty. The complaint alleged that Diaz, a nurse, 
murdered twelve patients by administering massive doses of 
the heart drug lidocaine. The preliminary hearing on the 
complaint commenced on July 6, 1982. Diaz moved to ex-
clude the public from the proceedings under California Penal 
Code § 868, which requires such proceedings to be open 
unless "exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect 
the defendant's right to a fair trial." 1 The magistrate 
' Section 868, as amended in 1982, provides in full: 
"The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of 
the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is 
necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the magis-
trate shall exclude from the examination every person except the clerk, 
court reporter and bailiff, the prosecutor and his or her counsel, the Attor-
84-156~0PINION 
2 PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
granted the unopposed motion, finding that closure was nec-
essary because the case had attracted national publicity and 
"only one side may get reported in the media." J. A. 23a. 
The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days. Most of 
the testimony and the evidence presented by the State was 
medical and scientific; the remainder consisted of testimony 
by personnel who worked with Diaz on the shifts when the 
twelve patients died. Diaz did not introduce any evidence, 
but his counsel subjected most of the witnesses to vigorous 
cross-examination. Diaz was held to answer on all charges. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner Press-Enterprise 
Company asked that the transcript of the proceedings be re-
leased. The magistrate refused and sealed the record. 
On January 21, 1983, the State moved in Superior Court to 
have the transcripts of the preliminary hearing released to 
the public; petitioner later joined in support of the motion. 
Diaz opposed the motion, contending that release of the tran-
scripts would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Su-
perior Court found that the information in the transcript was 
"as factual as it could be," and that the facts were neither "in-
flammatory" nor "exciting" but there was, nonetheless, "a 
ney General, the district attorney of the county, the investigating officer, 
the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the witness is testify-
ing, the defendant and his or her counsel, the officer having the defendant 
in custody and a person chosen by the prosecuting witness who is not him-
self or herself a witness but who is present to provide the prosecuting wit-
ness moral support, provided that the person so chosen shall not discuss 
prior to or during the preliminary examination the testimony of the pros-
ecuting witness with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who 
is a witness in the examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the 
right to exclude witnesses as provided in Section 687 of the Penal Code." 
Before 1982, the statute gave the defendant the unqualified right to close 
the proceedings. After the California Supreme Court rejected a First 
Amendment attack on the old statute in San Jose Mercury-News v. 
Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), the California legislature amended 
the statute to include the present requirement that the hearing be closed 
only upon a finding by the magistrate that closure is "necessary in order to 
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial." 
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reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of the 
transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial." 
J. A. 60. 
Petitioner then filed a peremptory writ of mandate with 
the Court of Appeal. That court originally denied the writ 
but, after being so ordered by the California Supreme Court, 
set the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, Diaz waived his 
right to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the tran-
script. After holding that the controversy was not moot, the 
Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate. 
The California Supreme Court thereafter denied petition-
er's peremptory writ of mandate, holding that there is no 
general First Amendment right of access to preliminary 
hearings. The court reasoned that the right of access to 
criminal proceedings recognized in Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U. S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise 1), 
and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596 
(1982), extended only to actual criminal trials. 37 Cal. 3d 
at 776. Furthermore, the reasons that had been asserted for 
closing the proceedings in Press Enterprise I and Globe-the 
interests of witnesses and other third parties-were not the 
same as the right asserted in this case-the defendant's right 
to a fair and impartial trial by a jury uninfluenced by news 
accounts. 
Having found no general First Amendment right of access, 
the court then considered the circumstances in which the clo-
sure would be proper under the California access statute, 
Penal Code§ 868. Under the statute, the court reasoned, if 
the defendant establishes a "reasonable likelihood of substan-
tial prejudice" the burden shifts to the prosecution or the 
media to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there 
is no such reasonable probability of prejudice. 37 Cal. 3d at 
782. 
We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1985). We 
reverse. 
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II 
We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction under 
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. In this Court, petitioner 
challenges the Superior Court's original refusal to release the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing. As noted above, the 
specific relief petitioner seeks has already been granted-the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing was released after Diaz 
waived his right to a jury trial. Similar circumstances were 
presented in Globe Newspaper, supra, at 603, and Gannett v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 377-378 (1979), where we held 
that because controversies involving public access to judicial 
proceedings are "capable of repetition, yet evading review," 
such controversies do not become moot simply because the 
relief sought has been granted. Globe and Gannett, there-
fore, require the conclusion that this case is not moot. Ac-
cordingly, we turn to the merits. 
III 
It is important to identify precisely what the California 
Supreme Court decided: 
" ... we conclude that the magistrate shall close the pre-
liminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of 
substantial prejudice which would impinge upon the 
right to a fair trial. Penal code section 868 makes clear 
that the primary right is the right to a fair trial and that 
the public's right of access must give way when there is a 
conflict." 
It is difficult to disagree in the abstract with that court's 
analysis balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against 
the public right of access. It is also important to remember 
that these interests are not necessarily inconsistent. 
Plainly, the defendant has a right to a fair trial but, as we 
have repeatedly recognized, one of the important means of 
assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral 
observors. 
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The right to an open public trial is a shared right of the ac-
cused and the public, the common concern being the assur-
ance of fairness. Only recently, in Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U. S. 39 (1984), for example, we considered whether the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to an open trial prevented 
the closure of a suppression hearing over the defendant's ob-
jection. We noted that the First Amendment right of access 
would in most instances attach to such proceedings and that 
"the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less 
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment 
right of the press and public." I d., at 46. When the defend-
ant objects to the closure of a suppression hearing, therefore, 
the hearing must be open unless the party seeking to close 
the hearing advances an overriding interest that is likely to 
be prejudiced. !d., at 47. 
Here, unlike Waller, the right asserted is not the defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial since the de-
fendant requested a closed preliminary hearing. Instead, 
the right asserted here is that of the public under the First 
Amendment. See Gannett, supra, at 397 (JUSTICE POWELL, 
concurring). The California Supreme Court concluded that 
the First Amendment was not implicated because the pro-
ceeding was not a criminal trial, but a preliminary hearing. 
However, the First Amendment question cannot be resolved 
solely on the label we give the event, i. e., "trial" or other-
wise, particularly where the preliminary hearing functions 
much like a full scale trial. 
In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right 
of access to criminal proceedings, our decisions have empha-
sized two complementary considerations. First, because a 
"'tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of 
experience"' Globe Newpaper, 457 U. S., at 605 (quoting 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 589 
(1980) (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in judgment)), we 
have considered whether the place and process has histori-
cally been open to the press and general public. 
1 
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In Press-Enterprise I, for example, we observed "that, 
since the development of trial by jury, the process of selec-
tion of jurors has presumptively been a public process with 
exceptions only for good cause shown." 464 U. S., at 501. 
In Richmond Newspapers, we reviewed some of the early 
history of England's open trials from the day when a trial was 
much like a "town meeting." In the days before the Norman 
Conquest, criminal cases were brought before "moots," a col-
lection of the freemen in the community. The public trial, 
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice" in Eng-
land, was recognized early on in the colonies. There were 
risks, of course, inherent in such a "town meeting" trial-the 
risk that it might become a gathering moved by emotions or 
passions growing from the nature of a crime; a "lynch mob" 
ambience is hardly conducive to calm, reasoned decisionmak-
ing based on evidence. Plainly the modern trial with jurors 
open to interrogation for possible bias is a far cry from the 
"town meeting trial" of ancient English practice. Yet even 
our modern procedural protections have their origin in the 
ancient common law principle which provided, not for closed 
proceedings, but rather for rules of conduct for those who at-
tend trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 567. 
Second, in this setting the Court has traditionally consid-
ered whether public access plays a significant positive role in 
the functioning of the particular process in question. Globe 
Newspaper, 457 U. S., at 606. Although many govern-
mental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes 
little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of 
government operations that would be totally frustrated if 
conducted openly. A classic example is that "the proper 
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the se-
crecy of grand jury proceedings." Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol 
Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211, 218 (1979). Other proceed-
ings plainly require public access. In Press-Enterprise I, we 
summarized the holdings of prior cases, noting that openness 
in criminal trials, including the selection of jurors, "enhances 
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both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appear-
ance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the sys-
tem." 464 U. S., at 501. 
These considerations of experience and logic are, of course, [ 
related, for history and experience shape the functioning of 
governmental processes. If the particular proceeding in 
question passes these tests of experience and logic, a quali-
fied First Amendment right of public access attaches. But I 
even when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute. 
Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596, 606 
(1981). While open criminal proceedings give assurances of 
fairness to both the public and the accused, there are some 
limited circumstances in which the right of the accused to a 
fair trial might be undermined by publicity. 2 In such cases, 
the trial court must determine whether the situation is such 
that the rights of the accused override the qualified First 
Amendment right of access. In Press-Enterprise I we 
stated: 
"the presumption may be overcome only by an overrid-
ing interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along 
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly en-
tered." 464 U. S., at 501. 
IV 
A 
The considerations that led the Court to apply the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials in R ichmond 
Newspapers and Globe and the selection of jurors in Press 
2 Similarly, the rights of those other than the accused may be impli-
cated. The protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and 
embarrassment of public scrutiny may create a compelling need to close 
certain aspects of a criminal proceeding. See Globe Newspaper Co . v. Su-
perior Court, 457 U. S. 596, 607-610 (1982). 
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Enterprise I lead us to conclude that the right of access ap-
plies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California. 
First, there has been a tradition of accessibility to prelimi-
nary hearings of the type conducted in California. Although 
grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed to the 
public and the accused, preliminary hearings conducted be-
fore neutral and detached magistrates have been open to the 
public. Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for 
treason, for example, with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as 
trial judge, the probable cause hearing was held in the Hall of 
the House of Delegates in Virginia, the court room being too 
small to accommodate the crush of interested citizens. 
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (CCD. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 
692). From Burr until the present day, the near uniform 
practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct pre-
liminary hearings in open court. 3 As we noted in Gannett, 
3 The vast majority of states considering the issue have concluded that 
the same tradition of accessibility that applies to criminal trials applies to 
preliminary proceedings. See, e. g., Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 
281 Ark. 152, 662 S. E. 2d 174 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 
569, 202 S. E. 2d 815, 819 (1982); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 
P. 2d 49, 56 (Hawaii 1978); State ex rel. Post-Tribune Publ. Co., 412 N. E. 
2d 748 (Ind. 1980); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S. W. 2d 749, 
752 (Ky. App. 1980); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P. 2d 116 
(Mont. 1980); Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, 406 A. 
2d 137 (NH 1979); State v. Williams, 93 N. J. 39 (1983); Westchester Rock-
land Newspapers v. Leggett, 399 N. E. 2d 518, 523 (NY 1979); Minot Daily 
News v. Holum, 380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); State ex rel. Dayton News-
papers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N. E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1976); Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 503, 387 A. 2d 425, 434 (1978); Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984); Herald Association, 
Inc. v. Ellison, 419 A. 2d 323, 326 (Vermont 1980); Federated Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P. 2d 440 (1980); State ex rel. 
Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S. E. 2d 544 (W. Va. 1980); Williams v. 
Stafford, 589 P. 2d 322 (Wyo. 1979). Compare In re Midland Publishing, 
420 Mich. 148, 173 (1984) (proceedings leading to a person's indictment 
have not been open to the public). 
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several states following the original New York Field Code of 
Criminal Procedure published in 1850 have allowed prelimi-
nary hearings to be closed on the motion of the accused. 443 
U. S., at 390-391. But even in these states the proceedings 
are presumptively open to the public and are closed only for 
cause shown. 4 Open preliminary hearings, therefore, have 
been accorded "'the favorable judgment of experience.'" 
Globe, supra, at 605. 
The second question is whether public access to prelimi-
nary hearings as they are conducted in California plays a par-
ticularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of 
the process. We have already determined in Richmond 
Newspapers, Globe, and Press Enterprise I that public access 
to criminal trials and the selection of jurors is essential to the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system. California 
preliminary hearings are sufficiently like a trial to justify the 
same conclusion. 
In California, to bring a felon to trial, the prosecutor has a 
choice of securing a grand jury indictment or a finding of 
probable cause following a preliminary hearing. But even 
Other courts have noted that some pretrial proceedings have no histori-
cal counterpart, but, given the importance of the pretrial proceeding to the 
criminal trial, the traditional right of access should still apply. See, e. g., 
Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa 
1983); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N. W. 2d 550 
(Minn. 1983); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S. E. 2d 
915 (Va. 1981). 
• See State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P. 2d 206 (1957); Azbill v. 
Fisher, 442 P. 2d 916 (Nev. 1968). Although Arizona, Iowa, Montana, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah have closure statutes based on the 
Field Code, see Gannett, 443 U. S., at 391, in each of these states the 
supreme court has found either a common law or state constitutitional right 
of the public to attend pretrial proceedings. See Phoenix Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257 (1966); Iowa Freedom of Information 
Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Great Falls Tribune v. 
District Court, 608 P. 2d 116 (Mont. 1980); Minot Daily News v. Holum, 
380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A. 2d 318 (Pa. 
1980); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984). 
• 
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when the accused has been indicted by a grand jury, how-
ever, he has an absolute right to an elaborate preliminary 
hearing before a neutral magistrate. Hawkins v. Superior 
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584 (1978). The accused has the right to 
personally appear at the hearing, to be represented by coun-
sel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpa-
tory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence. 
Cal. Penal Code§§ 859-866, 1538.5. If the magistrate deter-
mines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over 
for trial; such a finding leads to a guilty plea in the majority of 
cases. 
It is true that unlike a criminal trial, the California prelimi-
nary hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused 
and the adjudication is before a magistrate or other judicial 
officer without a jury. But these features, standing alone, 
do not make public access any less essential to the proper 
functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice 
process. Because of its extensive scope, the preliminary 
hearing is often the final and most important step in the crim-
inal proceeding. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 46-47 
(1984). As the California Supreme Court stated in San Jose 
Mercury News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510 
(1982), the preliminary hearing in many cases provides "the 
sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice 
system." See also Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572. 
Similarly, the absence of a jury, long recognized as "an in-
estimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous pros-
ecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge," 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159 (1968), makes the 
importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even 
more significant. "People in an open society do not demand 
infallability from their institutions, but it is difficult for them 
to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Rich-
mond Newspapers, supra, at 572. 
Denying the transcripts of a 41 day preliminary hearing 
would frustrate what we have characterized as the "commu-
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nity therapeutic value" of openness. I d., at 570. Criminal 
acts, especially certain violent crimes, provoke public con-
cern, outrage, and hostility. "When the public is aware that 
the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is 
functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable 
reactions and emotions." Press Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at 
509. See also H. Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-131 
(1956); T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959). In sum, 
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not ac-
tually attending trials can have confidence that stand-
ards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge 
that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that estab-
lished procedures are being followed and that deviations 
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the 
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of 
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system." 
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at 508. (emphasis in 
original). 
We therefore conclude that the qualified First Amendment 
right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary 
hearings as they are conducted in California. 
B 
Since a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches 
to preliminary hearings in California under Cal. Penal Code 
§ § 858 et seq., the proceedings cannot be closed unless spe-
cific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that 
"closure is essential to preserve higher values and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest." Press-Enterprise I, 
464 U. S., at 510. See also Globe, supra, 457 U. S., at 
606-607. If the interest asserted is the right of the accused 
to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if 
specific findings are made demonstrating that first, there is a 
substantial probability that the defenda t's right to a fair 
trial will be rejudic b ublicit and that closure would 
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adequately protect the defendant's free trial rights. See id.; 
Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 581. 
The California Supreme Court, interpreting its access stat-
ute, concluded "that the magistrate shall close the prelimi-
nary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of substan-
tial prejudice." 37 Cal. 3d, at 781. As the court itself 
acknowledged the "reasonable likelihood" test places a lesser 
burden on the defendant than the "substantial probability" 
test which we hold is called for by the First Amendment. 
See id.; see also id., at 783 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Moreover, that court failed to consider whether alter-
natives short of complete closure would have protected the 
interests of the accused. 
In Gannett we observed that: 
"Publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings such 
as the one involved in the present case poses special 
risks of unfairness. The whole purpose of such hearings 
is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence 
and insure that this evidence does not become known to 
the jury. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368. Public-
ity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing, 
however, could influence public opinion against a defend-
ant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory informa-
tion wholly inadmissible at the actual trial." 
443 U. S., at 378. 
But this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify re-
fusing public access to hearings on every motion to suppress. 
Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some circum-
stances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowl-
edge of the case would disable them from rendering an impar-
tial verdict. And even if closure were justified for the 
hearings on a motion to suppress, closure of an entire 41 day 
proceeding would rarely be warranted. The First Amend-
ment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory 
assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that 
84-1560--0PINION 
PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 13 
right. And any limitation "must be narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest." Press Enterprise, supra, at 510. 
The standard applied by the California Supreme Court 
failed to consider the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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